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Hilton v. South Carolina Public. Rail-
way Commission: FEDERAL STAT-
UTE IMPOSING LIABILITY ON 
ST ATE-OWNED RAILROADS 
FOR DAMAGES TO INJURED 
EMPLOYEES ENFORCEABLE IN 
STATE COURTS ONLY. 
In Hilton v. South Carolina Public 
Railways Commission, 112 S. Ct. 560 
(1991), the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act continued to authorize 
suits for damages against state-owned 
railroads and was enforceable in state 
courts, but not in federal courts. In 
reaching its decision, the Court deter-
mined that a federally-based action 
brought in state court did not abrogate 
a State's immunity from suit under the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, because that 
amendment has been held not to apply 
to state courts. The Court's ruling 
ensured that state-employed railroad 
workers would have a forum in which 
to redress work-related injuries. 
The South Carolina Public Rail-
ways Commission, an agency of the 
State of South Carolina, was a com-
mon carrier engaged in interstate com-
merce by railroad. Kenneth Hilton, a 
railroad worker, claimed to have been 
injured while on the job due to the 
negligence ofthe Commission. Under 
South Carolina law, railroad workers 
were excluded from coverage under 
the workers' compensation statute. 
Thus, in order to recover for his inju-
ries, Hilton sued the Commission un-
derthe remedial provisions ofthe Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act (FELA) 
in a federal court. 
While Hilton's case was pending, 
the Supreme Court decided the case of 
Welch v. Texas Department of High-
ways and Public Transportation, 483 
U.S. 468 (1987), holding that a federal 
statute which incorporated the reme-
dial provisions of FE LA, did not allow 
a cause of action to be maintained 
against a state agency in a federal court. 
In light of this decision, Hilton dis-
missed his suit in federal court and 
refiled in a South Carolina state court. 
The state trial court dismissed Hilton's 
claim, basing its decision upon a read-
ing of Welch, together with the subse-
quent Supreme Court decision of Will 
v. Michigan Department of State Po-
lice, 491 U.S. 58(1989). Thetrialcourt 
interpreted these cases as precluding a 
FELA suit for damages against a state 
agency, even if maintained in a state 
forum. Hilton appealed and the state 
supreme court aff"rrmed the lower court's 
decision. 
Reversing the state courts' decisions, 
the United States Supreme Court drew 
a sharp distinction between a FELA 
based action maintained in a federal 
court and one in a state court. The Court 
recognized that a FELA action brought 
in federal court implicated the States' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit. Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. 
Comm 'n, 112 S. ct. 560, 563 (1991). 
Applying an Eleventh Amendment 
analysis, the Court found that FELA 
did not contain a clear expression of 
congressional intent to abrogate the 
States' Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, and therefore, FELAactions could 
not be maintained in a federal court. [d. 
(citing Welch, 483 U.S. at 474-76). 
Because the Eleventh Amendment 
has been held not to apply to state 
courts, the Court determined that a 
FELA action brought in a state court 
did not implicate any constitutional 
rule of law. [d. at 565. Thus, Hilton 
presented a case of pure statutory con-
struction, which left the Court to decide 
the issue of whether Congress, in enact-
ing FELA, intended to create a cause of 
action against the States to be enforced 
in a state court. [d. 
The Court re-examined its first in-
terpretation of FE LA in Parden v. Ter-
minal Railway of Alabama Docks De-
partment, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). The 
Court noted that in Parden the terms of 
FELA were construed to mean that 
when Congress used the phrase "[ e ] very 
common carrier by railroad" to describe 
the class of employers subject to 
FELA's terms, it intended to include 
state-owned railroads. Hilton, 112 S. 
Ct. at 563 (citing Parden, 377 U.S. at 
187-88). The Court then reaffirmed 
that interpretation, holding that FELA 
continued to authorize suits for dam-
ages against state-owned railroads. [d 
The Court concluded, however, that 
the second part of its decision in 
Parden, which held that by entering 
the business of operating a railroad a 
State waived its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from suit in a federal court, 
had been overturned by its subsequent 
decision in Welch. [d. at 563. Thus, 
the Court narrowed the issue presented 
to whether FELA based actions could 
be enforced in a state court. 
The Commission contended that 
this issue was controlled by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Will v. 
Michigan Department of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58 (1989). Hilton, 112 S. Ct. 
at 565. In Will, the Court held that a 
State is not a ''person'' suable under a 
federal statute which lacked any "clear 
statement" of congressional intent to 
impose liability. [d. at 563 (citing Will, 
491 U.S. at 58). The Commission 
argued that the "clear statement" rule 
should be read in context with the 
Court's decision in Welch, that FELA 
did not contain a clear statement of 
congressional intent, to effectively 
overturn the entire holding of Parden. 
[d. 
The Court disagreed, reasoning that 
the "clear statement" rule should not 
automatically be implemented when a 
case did not involve an issue of consti-
tutional interpretation. [d. at 565-66. 
Instead, the Court categorized the clear 
statement rule as a canon of statutory 
construction in those cases which did 
not implicate the States' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. [d. In resolv-
ing a case of pure statutory construc-
tion, the Court found the doctrine of 
stare decisis most compelling because 
it promoted stability, predictability and 
respect for judicial authority. [d. at 
563-64. In the instant case, the Court 
determined that the policy consider-
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ations for upholding Parden far out-
weighed the arguments for departure 
from its original interpretation ofFELA 
in 1964. Id. at 564. 
The Court interpreted the fact that 
Congress had not taken any action to 
alter the Court's decision in the 28 
years since Parden was decided as 
meaning that the legislative branch 
was in agreement with the holding. Id. 
The Court also recognized that many 
States had acted in reliance upon FELA 
in drafting their workers' compensa-
tion statutes, so that overruling Parden 
would require an extensive legislative 
response to provide coverage to rail-
road workers. Id. Most importantly, 
the Court noted that overruling Parden 
would strip all FELA protection from 
state-employed workers, leaving the 
plaintiffin this case, Hilton, without a 
forum to redress his work related in-
jury.Id. 
In a strongly-worded dissent, Jus-
tice O'Connor argued that the 
majority's overriding concern to leave 
Hilton a forum to redress his injuries 
caused the majority to misapply the 
Court's previous decisions, which 
would have clearly overruled the hold-
ing of Parden. Id. at 566, 570. The 
dissent found no distinction to be made 
between a federal or state forum when 
a plaintiffbrought suit under a federal 
statute. In both situations, the "clear 
statement" rule enunciated in Will 
should have been applied. Id. at 567. 
Thus, based on the holding of Welch, 
that FELA did not contain a clear state-
ment of congressional intent to abro-
gate State immunity, Justice O'Connor 
argued that the Court should overturn 
the remedial provisions of FELA and 
affirm the state courts' decision in 
Hilton. Id. As a result, O'Connor con-
cluded that state legislatures would be 
compelled to redraft statutes which 
excluded railroad workers from cover-
age, in order to provide an alternative 
remedy, and the plaintiff in this case 
would be denied a remedy in a court of 
law. Id. at 570. 
In Hilton v. South Carolina Public 
Railways Commission, the Supreme 
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Court held that FELA created a cause 
of action against state-owned railroads 
to be enforced in state courts only. The 
Court's decision left state-employed 
railroad workers with a forum of re-
course to redress work-related injuries. 
It also avoided the possibility of re-
quiring an extensive legislative redraft-
ing of many state workers' compensa-
tion statutes, which exclude these work-
ers from coverage because of the draft-
ers' reliance upon previous Supreme 
Court decisions. 
- Linda M Googins 
Willy v. Coastal Corp.: RULE 11 
SANCTIONS UPHELD AL-
THOUGH THE FEDERAL DIS-
TRICT COURT WAS SUBSE-
QUENTL Y FOUND TO LACK 
JURISDICTION. 
In Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. 
Ct. 1076 (1992), a unanimous Court 
concluded that Article III ofthe United 
States Constitution was not violated 
when a federal district court that lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction imposed 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Those sanctions were of a collateral 
concern to the case because the sanc-
tioned behavior was unrelated to 
Donald J. Willy's effort to convince 
the federal district court that it lacked 
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court 
determined that it did not raise the 
issue of a district court adjudicating the 
merits of a "case or controversy" over 
which it lacked jurisdiction. 
Willy filed suit against Coastal Cor-
poration ("Coastal") after he was dis-
charged as in-house counsel. Willy 
alleged that Coastal violated state and 
federal environmental laws and that 
Coastal tenninated his employment due 
to his refusal to participate in these 
alleged transgressions. Willy asserted 
that the termination ofhis employment 
by Coastal violated state and federal 
laws, including ''whistleblower'' pro-
visions. 
Although Willy sued in Texas state 
court, Coastal claimed that there was 
original federal question jurisdiction 
under Title 28, sections 1331 and 1441 
of the United States Code. The case 
was subsequently removed to federal 
district court. Despite Willy's objec-
tions, the district court concluded that 
it had subject matter jurisdiction. The 
district court granted Coastal's motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
and the court also dismissed the pen-
dent state claims made by Willy. In 
addition, the district court allowed 
Coastal's motion for Rule 11 sanc-
tions. The court awarded Coastal 
attorney's fees against Willy and his 
attorney, jointly and severally. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed the district court order 
that dismissed Willy's claims and re-
manded the case to state court. It 
concluded that the complaint did not 
raise claims arising under federal law, 
and thus, the district court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. The court of 
appeals, however, upheld the Rule 11 
sanctions imposed by the district court, 
and on remand the district court was 
ordered to determine the appropriate 
amount of attorneys' fees to be recov-
ered by Coastal. 
On the second appeal, the court 
affirmed the district court's reassess-
ment of the amount of attorney's fees 
to be paid by Willy and his attorney. 
The court of appeals also rejected 
Willy's objection that the district court 
did not have constitutional authority to 
impose Rule 11 sanctions when it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 
at 1078. The court stated that Rule 11 
sanctions were within the inherent pow-
ers of all federal courts, and therefore, 
the district court had appropriately ex-
ercised this power. 
The United States Supreme Court 
agreed with Willy's argument that in 
the Rules Enabling Act and in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
"implicit premise ... [is] that rules of 
practice and procedure are not neces-
sary of disputes beyond the judicial 
power conferred by Article III." [d. at 
1 078-79 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 
at 28). Notwithstanding that premise, 
the Court responded that this does not 
